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No single human could bring to
the forefront in education the influence that James Coleman's
critics believe he possesses.
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In the last few years many articles have been written
criticizing James Coleman, author of the Coleman
Report's One and Two. Some critics have tried to point out
that his research Is less than scholarly. Others have ac·
cused Coleman of failing to recognize the difference bet·
ween his scientific findings and hi s personal beliefs. All of
these efforts have accomplished more for Coleman's
image as a significant policy maker than anything else. In
reality no single human cou ld bring to the forefront the in·
eve he possesses.
fluence that many of his critics beli
In one incident, for exampl e, Coleman was criticized
as the scholar who influenced President Richard Nixon of
radically changing the federal government's school in·
tegration policies. According to Biloine Young and Grace
Bress in their article "Coleman's Retreat and the Politics
of GOOd Intentions", Coleman was a "significant par·
ticipant" in the Nixon decision to transfer school in·
tegratioo efforts to the Jurisdiction of the fedetat courts.• A
close investigation of these events reveals that contrary to
popular bel ief Coleman actually had very little to do w ith
this decision. Even before Coleman arrived in Washington
as an aid to Nixon, the administration was well on their
way of shifting this responsibility to the courts.
Desperately Coleman challenged this action, even going
beyond his own research capabllltles to predict that integration does promote achievement.
Initially Nixon intended to use some of Coleman's
studies as a rationale for federalnal
ed ucatio
aid cuts. The
Westinghouse Study and tHe 1966 Equality of Educational
Opportunity Report were specifically used to point out
that quality equipment did not make a significant dif·
ference In achievement scores, thus federal funds could
be more adroitly used elsewhere-Vietnam. However,
since public schooling was a popular home town
congressional program. ultimately Nixon signed a bill that
increased educational aid rather than reducing it.•
Keeping in mind his Southern Strategy, Nixon con·
tinued to attempt to walk the tine between the conservatives and the liberals. He appeared to be probing in
various directions, attempting to establis
a sound in·
h
tegration policy, acceptable to all. At one point, he asked
Health, Education and Welfar
e (HEW) Secretary Rlchar<I
son to submit an amendment to an educational finance
bill, forbidding the use of federal dollars to support
bussing, Richardson. disg runtled, threatened to resign.
After a meeting, the President withdrew his proposal, and
Richardson remained with the administration.• New York
Times W(lter, Fred Hechinger, noted In 1970, " Education
was caught between white segregationists, black power
and sheer difficulty. Integration was not dead but it ap·
peared at least to be in limbo."•
Apparently the term "quality schools" was
something everyone could agree was significant. Despite
the fact that integration had procee<led to the point that
the South was more totally integrated than the North,
Nixon did not dwell on this fact. Coleman believed that
quality schools meant integrated schOols and challenged
the Administration to move torward on this issue. Within
this context Coleman made his famous statement "in·
tegratlon alone would reduce the existing achievement
gap between biacks and whites as much as 30 per cent."
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Yet this announcement was not a plea for total Integration
as much as It was a call for assistance in developing
ern
.i e
educational
lt
at ves "Th
nation' s sc hool
authorities," said Coleman, "seem too transfixed with one
technique of integration when there is a variety of ways to
make it work ... federal aid is needed to develop possibly
the voucher plan and after-school facilities to attract all
types of people."' A New York Times interpretation of this
statement pointed out that Coleman was in tact
suggesting that Integration could be achieved In a number
of ways, such as integrated trips to mus.eums and to
laboratories where individuals would learn in a variety of
environments.•

Coleman often cited the fact that Americans lived in
an information rich society, where education could be
taught by volu nteer tutors, by store-front schools, by l~rge
corporations. television, radio, newspapers, magazines
and books, through the use o f vouchers.' Ultimately, he
noted integration was not a question of increasing
achievement 30 per cent or any other per cent, but
basically a ques1ion of morality. " Are we willing," he
asked, "to let schools be the vehicle through which the
society separates individuals Into two parts, separate and
unequal?''•
During hi s Washington tenure, Coleman ac ted as an
advisor on the Federal Emergency School Aid Act, which
was d esigned to assist schools undergoing court-ordere<l
desegregation. His recommendations were large in the
area of providing finances for interracial experiences out·
side the public school system through the util ization of
private agencies and other educational enterprises.•
Eventual ly the Admini stration decided lhat the en·
forcement of school desegregation efforts should be
limited to de jure components only. Since Coleman
believe<l that de facto and de jure segregation could not
be distinguishe<l except supposedly one takes place in
the North and the other in the South, he thought that these
proposed policies were too limited and accused some of
the federal ad ministrators of being " neoseg re·
gationists.'' 10
Earlier In February 1970, Senator John Sten~is
pointed out this same discrepancy and attempted to introduce an amendment which would req uire the govern·
ment to cut funds where Northern de facto segregation
existed. In April, however, that specific education bill was
passed withou t the Stennis proposal."
By the summer of 1970 the Nixon Adm inis tration was
backing away from the orig lnal Johnso n school _on.
tegration commitment. The Civol Rights Comm1ss1on
score<l the Adminstration for Its retreat. Kenneth Cfarl<,
New Yori<
professor, blamed Nixon for
defaulting on school integration leadership." Coleman,
before Walt
er Mondale's
Senate Select Committee on
Equal Educational Integration, again discussed..the
academic benefits of integration. Through such policies,
the achievement gap between the two races could be
narrowed as much as "25 per cent," he stated. Yet as an
appendage to this announcement, he conUnued to ad·
vocate educational flexibility by supporting such ex·
periments as the Parkway School Program of
Philadelphia."
Eventually, the Administration found a new Individual
to rally their forces. He was Alexan.d er Bicket, a Yale
professor whO claime<l that complete integration was om·
possible and called the Coleman Report nothing more
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than an ambiguous slatement." Bickel, a staunch sup·
a porter of neighborhood schools, was In; and Col eman, al·
tor six months, was out.
Was Coleman's influence the primary factor in the
Administration's policy change? Did Coleman, as some
have charged, have a monopoly on. governmental
thinking? Even before Coleman's arrival on Washington,
the Nixon Administration had decided to change its
policy. In the fall of 1969, the Administration announced
that It would renegotiate with one hundred school dos·
tric ts who had received federal school aid cuts, due to
segregation policies." Leon E. Panetta, testifying In
March 1970, state<l that the HEW retreat was attributed to
Senator John Stennis' concern for Mississippi's in·
tegration policies. According to Panetta, Stennis
treatened to withdraw as Senate floor leadership of the
President's embattled Safeguard Antlballistlc Mlss!le
System if the Administration persisted in promoting on·
leg ration at all costs. "The retreat," said Panetta, " was a
political choice aimed at appeasing the South." He note<l
that neither Bob Haldeman nor John Ehrlichman was
aiding the integration effort, thereby leaving Robert Finch
the sole defender."
While
the President and his staff had
access to Coleman, he was hardly a significant advisor. At
the time that Coleman was supposedly advising the Ad·
ministration to switch to court enforcement, Bickel was
writing Nixon's educational policy statements. According
to Syracuse University Professor Gerald Grant, the
President's March 26, 1970, educational statement reflec·
ted the differences of expert advice with Coleman on one
side of the issue and Bickel on the other." In trying to
assess the role that individuals played in this important
policy change, George Wallace was probably a more
significant advisor than either Coleman or Bickel. After
winning a 1970 Alabama Governor's election. Wallace
predicted that there would be a dramatic change in the Ad·
ministration 's Integration pol icies. Approximately 28 days
later, Finch resigned.
Earlier In that year, Leon Panetta, Director of the Civil
Rights Enforcement Division , had resigned. By the end of
1970, U.S. Commissioner of Education, James ;Allen was
on his way. This action made it a clean sweep; Nixon had a
completely new staff. Elliot Richardson became HEW
Secretary, Sidney Marland, who en.dorsed moderate
bussing 0 became the new Commissioner of Education and
J . Stanl ey Pottinger assumed Panetta's position. The
newest desegregation policy was announced in August,
1970, by Attorney General John Mitchell." In essence the
Administration decide<l to rely on court action to enforce
Universit' y'This wilt consist," state<l Mitchell, "'of filing
Integration.
and arg uing lawsuits based upon the jurisdiction of the
Fourteenth Amendment."" No longer would the federal
government send marshalls to the South or anywhere
else.
It was the untimely fate of the school integration el·
fort to fall upon the eve of a foreign war which sh~ this
nation to its very foundations. Many with educational
foresight and dedication were forced to retreat, propelling
Into the White House an individual whose record lacked
the same quality of commitment. From the beginning
Ni xon had written o ff the civi l rights vote. With most o f the
big Northern states controlling their 1968 delegates,
Nixon w as forced to go South where Republicans were not
restraine<l. Here was the birth of the Southern Strategy,
conceived in necessity but gradually assuming the spec·
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tacle of a grand design. Under the gu idance of Mitchell,
this political strategy decreed that any thing the South
might perceive as faintly hostile w as forbidden.
Ultimately, desegregation enforcement programs
were deemphasized and shifted out of the governmental
domain and Into the courts. The pivotal personnel ele·
ments in this action were the Senators from Mississippi
and South Carolina, John Stennis and Strom Thurmond,
and Governor George Wal lace, who applied the pressure,
gently at first, hoping to suspend HEW desegregation
guidelines authOrized by the 1964 Civil Rights Act."
Avowing that he favored freedom of choice plans, Nixon
set to work changi ng his s taff, realig ning educational
po
and in general slowing the momentum of the
desegregation effort. Those who advocated the old John·
son pol icies were eventually overwhelmed and retreated
to the sideli nes. And in the overall
is, Co
analys
leman w
as
not a signig icant participant but si mply one small voice in
a ti me o f overwhelming po litical change.
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